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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
Department Editor: Richard G. Kahn*
ABANDONMENT OF INTRASTATE SEGMENT OF INTERSTATE AIR
ROUTE
T has been reported that many airlines are anxious to abandon service to
smaller stops to which they were certificated in the flurry of post-war
expansion.' This tendency toward voluntary applications for abandonment,
coupled with the prospect of more frequent use of the Civil Aeronautics
Board's powers to alter, amend, modify, and suspend routes, 2 may eventually
result in an answer to the question of just how extensive the Board's powers
are in respect to economic regulation of intrastate air operations which
affect interstate air transportation.
It is reasonable to assume that in many cases in which the decision of the
Board may alter an intrastate service which is incidental to the interstate
service primarily under consideration, the State regulatory commission and
other state and local interests will enter the picture, not always in a mood of
humble subjection to the will of the federal agency. This possibility was
anticipated by Chicago and Southern Air Lines in its recent application to
the Board to abandon the Illinois cities of Bloomington, Peoria, and Spring-
field, to which the airline was certificated under its Chicago-New Orleans
route.3 Chicago and Southern also held a certificate from the Illinois Com-
merce Commission covering this intrastate segment of the route. In recog-
nition of this dual regulation, Chicago and Southern pointedly asked the
Board that the requested abandonment order be made effective as of the date
that an abandonment order from the Illinois Commerce Commission should
become effective, or be worded in such manner as to eliminate the possibility
of the airline being required by the state agency to continue a service which
has been ordered abandoned by the Board. Does the Board, under the Civil
Aeronautics Act, have sufficient authority to prevail over the intrastate
interests?
The Board's opinion in the Chicago and Southern case, while based upon a
consideration of intrastate and local interests as well as upon the interstate
aspects of the service,4 expressed no doubt concerning the Board's authority
to prevail over these interests, and did not discuss the possibility of conflict
* Student Editor, Legal Publications Board, Northwestern University School
of Law.
I American Aviation, April 15, 1949, p. 6, "There's hardly a trunk airline in
the industry that doesn't want to get out of serving some of the small stops to
which they have been certificated within the past three years. Airlines asked for
small stops as protection against feeder expansion, but most such stops have
been costly to serve. Even secondary carriers want to abandon the smaller cities.
There will be increasing action by airlines toward suspension requests, and in
some areas feeder airlines will take over the service."
2 O'Connell, Legal Problems in Revising the Air Route Pattern, 15 J. Air L.
& C. 404 (1948). "I believe that you can look forward to an increasingly frequent
use of the Board's powers under Section 401 (h) of the Act . . . Certainly the
Board has not yet exercised its authority under this section sufficiently to be able
to say that we have inadequate legal powers in this field."
3 CAB Docket No. 3571. Application granted as to Peoria and Springfield;
deferred as to Bloomington, Chicago and Southern Air Lines, Inc. Abandonment
of Service to Peoria, Springfield and Bloomington, 10 CAB..., (Serial E-3488,
Oct. 27, 1949).
4 Chicago and Southern Air Lines, Inc. Abandonment of Service to Peoria,
Springfield and Bloomington, 10 CAB..., (Serial E-3488, Oct. 27, 1949), Ap-
pendix A (Report of Examiner).
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with any action taken by the Illinois Commerce Commission. Instead, the
Board adopted the following language of the examiner's report: "Although
these cities clearly should have adequate air service such service should be
economical, efficient and void of useless and destructive competition . . .
Clearly, the maintenance of such luxury competitive service cannot be con-
sidered as being in the public interest, and its continuance is not necessary
for the purpose of assuring the sound development of an air transportation
system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce
of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the National Defense." 5
It is well established that the Congress has power to regulate intrastate
commerce to the extent that such regulation is incidental to the effective reg-
ulation of interstate commerce., The extremes to which this concept can be
extended have been demonstrated in recent years by cases arising in fields
other than transportation. 7 Granting the power of Congress to regulate the
economic aspects of aviation just as broadly as it has these other fields of
commerce, has Congress actually done so in the Civil Aeronautics Act?
The words used by Congress in the economic regulations of the Act do not
clearly indicate that the regulations were intended to cover such intrastate
commerce. That more express language might have been used is illustrated
by comparison with the words used to define the Board's jurisdiction in
safety matters and with the language of the Interstate Commerce Act in the
railroad field.
The safety provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act and the economic reg-
ulations differ in their express coverage by virtue of the Act's definitions of
''air commerce" and "air transportation." "Air commerce," which sets forth
the scope of the Board's jurisdiction in safety matters,8 is defined in such a
way as to subject practically all operations to federal safety regulation.9  In
contrast, "air transportation," which term describes the Board's jurisdiction
5 Id. at 23.6 This was best said by Chief Justice Taft in Railroad Commission of Wis-
consin v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy RR Co., 257 U.S. 563 (1922) (Wisconsin
Rate Case; federal increase of discriminatory intrastate rail rates to correspond
with interstate rate increases upheld.), "Commerce is a unit and does not regard
state lines, and while, under the Constitution, interstate and intrastate commerce
are ordinarily subject to regulation by different sovereignties, yet when they are
so mingled together that the supreme authority, the nation, cannot exercise com-
plete effective control over interstate commerce without incidental regulation of
intrastate commerce, such incidental regulation is not an invasion of State
authority." Also Southern Railway Co. v. U.S., 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (federal
regulation of railroad vehicles used only in intrastate traffic upheld as valid
exercise of commerce power because of "real or substantial relation or connec-
tion" with interstate commerce) ; Houston, East and West Texas Railway Co. v.
U.S., 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (Shreveport Rate Case; federal regulation of intra-
state rail rates which discriminated against interstate traffic upheld).
7 Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173 (1946) (Em-
ployees of corporation which washed windows under contracts with customers
engaged in production for interstate commerce, held to be engaged in same and
subject to Fair Labor Standards Act); U.S. v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S.
110 (1942) (Federal control of milk produced and distributed solely within Illi-
nois upheld due to effect on interstate milk regulations) ; Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942) (wheat grown for individual's private use subject to federal
quota system due to effect on interstate commerce).
8 52 Stat. 1007 (1938), 49 USCA §551 (a) (Supp. 1948).
952 Stat. 977 (1939), 49 USCA §401 (3) (Supp. 1948). "'Air commerce'
means interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce or the transportation of mail
by aircraft or any operation or navigation of aircraft within the limits of any
civil airway or any operation or navigation of aircraft which directly affects, or
which may endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce."
In effect, this leaves only intrastate aviation which operates outside civil airways
and far enough removed therefrom so as not to affect or endanger interstate
air operations.
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in the field of economic regulation,' 0 is by definition restricted to carriage by
aircraft of persons or property as a common carrier for compensation or hire
or the carriage of mail, in interstate, overseas, or foreign commerce." By
so expressing the Board's jurisdiction in economic matters, the Congress cer-
tainly did not write into the economic sections of the Act the specific ideas of
broad jurisdiction which are included in the safety sections. 12
That the language which sets forth the economic jurisdiction of the
Board may not be as broad as it could be is also demonstrated by a considera-
tion of the jurisdiction granted the Interstate Commerce Commission in the
railroad field by the Interstate Commerce Act. That Act subjects to regula-
tion all common carriers engaged in railroad transportation,'3 but exempts
transportation which is wholly intrastate.' 4 The abandonment provisions
are made applicable to all carriers subject to that Act and apply to "all or any
portion of a line of railroad," 15 which read literally, appears to cover wholly
intrastate abandonments. However, the courts have in effect limited the
abandonment provisions to transportation subject to the Act, by refusing to
include a purely intrastate line which had no connection with or effect on
interstate commerce.' 8 The more express language of the Interstate Com-
merce Act setting forth the Commission's jurisdiction has been sufficient to
handle the railroad counterpart of the Chicago and Southern case-in Colo-
rado v. United States, a federal order to abandon an economically burden-
some intrastate branch was held to be valid because of the economic effect on
the interstate activities of the carrier.
17
Of course, these comparisons of the language used in the statutes are of
limited value, since the courts are not confined to a strict, literal interpreta-
tion of a statute, especially when the purposes and policies behind a statute
appear to license broader interpretation and application. This has proven
to be particularly true in cases involving interstate commerce.1 8 However,
in the transportation field, leading cases upholding federal regulation of
,intrastate commerce as incidental to the effective control of interstate com-
merce have been based upon statutes which go far in expressing the intent
of Congress to regulate such intrastate activities.19 For example, in the
Shreveport Rate Case,20 the Supreme Court upheld federal regulation of
intrastate rail rates which discriminated against interstate traffic, but in
doing so, the Court relied upon a statute which clearly outlawed the dis-
10 52 Stat. 987 (1938), 49 USCA §481 (a) (Supp. 1948).
11 52 Stat. 977 (1938), 49 USCA §401 (10), (21) (Supp. 1948).
12 Rhyne, Federal, State and Local Jurisdiction Over Civil Aviation, 11 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 466 (1946).
Is 41 Stat. 474 (1920), 49 USCA §1 (1) (1929).
14 41 Stat. 474 (1920), 49 USCA §1 (2) (1929).
15 41 Stat. 477 (1920), 49 USCA §1 (18) (1929).
16 Texas v. Eastern Texas Railroad Co., 258 U.S. 204 (1922).
17 271 U.S. 153 (1926).
'8 Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173 (1946); U.S. v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942) ; see note 7 supra.
19 Southern Railway Co. v. U.S., 222 U.S. 20 (1911), cited supra note 6;
Colorado v. U.S., 271 U.S. 153 (1926) (federal order to abandon economically
burdensome intrastate branch upheld because of effect on interstate commerce) ;
Wisconsin Rate Case, 257 U.S. 563 (1922), cited supra note 6. In these cases,
if power already existed, there would have been no need for additional legislation;
mere fact of additional legislation indicated Congressional intent to go further
and give these express powers over intrastate commerce incidental to regulation
of interstate commerce.
20 Houston, East and West Texas Railway Co. v. U.S., 234 U.S. 342 (1914),
cited supra note 6.
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criminatory practice involved in the case.21 That the acknowledged power
of Congress to regulate this type of intrastate commerce can go unexercised,
as has been suggested may be the case in regard to the economic regulations
of the Civil Aeronautics Act, was recognized in the Shreveport case, the
Court saying, ". . . in view of the aim of the act and the comprehensive
terms of the provisions against unjust discrimination, there is not ground
for holding that the authority of Congress was unexercised and that the
subject was thus left without governmental regulation ...- 22
If, however, the courts consider the general policies of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act, as they may be expected to do, in determining the economic
jurisdiction of the Board, there is reason to believe that the Act will be
liberally construed to include economic regulation of intrastate commerce
as an incident to the effective regulation of interstate commerce. The dec-
laration of policy of the Act 8 does not once use the term "interstate com-
merce," but rather "domestic commerce."'24 The latter term is not defined
in the. Act, but generally it means commerce carried on within the limits of
the Nation as distinguished from foreign commerce. 25 The term as used
in the Act has never been defined by the courts, but it is reasonable to
assume that it covers intrastate commerce within the United States as well
as interstate commerce; if the Congress had meant merely interstate com-
merce, it logically would have used that more exact term.
Applying the maxim that between an unconstitutional interpretation
of a statute and an equally reasonable constitutional interpretation, the lat-
ter will be favored, it may be assumed that "domestic commerce" as referred
to in the declaration of policy of the Act includes only that intrastate com-
merce which Congress may validly regulate, i.e., intrastate commerce the
regulation of which is incidental to the effective regulation of interstate
commerce.
26
Another point in the policy statement favors a liberal interpretation of
the economic regulations. One of the factors which the Board is directed
to consider in carrying out its powers and duties is "sound economic con-
ditions" in the industry.27 This factor is presumably equally as commanding
as the other policy considerations, and appears to cover the case of an
intrastate operation which is economically burdensome to an interstate
carrier. In view of the foregoing considerations, a broad interpretation
of the economic regulations to include many intrastate operations is not an
unexpected development.
21 24 Stat. 380 (1887), 49 USCA §3 (1) (1929) "Sec. 3. That it shall be un-
lawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act to make or
give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person,
company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic,
in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm,
corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, to any undue or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."
22 Houston, East and West Texas Railway Co. v. U.S., 234 U.S. 342 (1914),
at 358-359.
23 52 Stat. 980 (1938), 49 USCA §402 (Supp. 1948).
24 For example, para. (a), "The encouragement and development of an air-
transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the
foreign and domestic commerce . . ."; and para. (d), "Competition to the extent
necessary to assure the normal development of an air-transportation system prop-
erly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce . . ." (emphasis
supplied throughout).
25 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 359 (3d ed. 1933). "Domestic commerce" also
means, in reference to a state, commerce wholly within the state as distinguished
from interstate commerce; this meaning should not be confused with the use of
the term on a national level.
26 Wisconsin Rate Case, 257 U.S. 563 (1922), cited supra note 6.
2752 Stat. 980 (1938), 49 USCA §402(b) (Supp. 1948).
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Thus far, the economic regulations, as applied to physically intrastate
operations, have been before the courts only once, in Civil Aeronautics Board
v. Canadian Colonial Airways.28 That case is of dubious value, however, in
that it presented primarily a question of whether the airline was engaged
in interstate commerce or not, rather than whether an acknowledged intra-
state operation was, a burden on interstate commerce and subject to the
Board's authority on that ground. The route was, geographically, wholly
intrastate, being from New York City to Niagara Falls, and was not
certificated by the Board. Acting to enjoin the operation, the Board as-
serted its authority on the ground that passengers were using the service
as a leg of interstate and foreign journeys. According to the Board, this
was sufficient to characterize the service as interstate and therefore amen-
able to the authority of the Board. Canadian Colonial contended that even
if the Board's argument were accepted, the airline could not be held to be
engaged in interstate commerce if it was without knowledge of the origin
and destination of its passengers. In issuing an order permitting the Board
to examine pertinent documents and records of the carrier, the Federal
District Court recognized the possibility that a physically intrastate air
operation may be subject to the economic jurisdiction of the Board. How-
ever, any potentialities of this case as a court test of the Board's authority
ended when the airline submitted to a consent decree permanently enjoining
the operation. 29 The case is also of limited value in the question at hand in
that there was no certificate from the State of New York, and the State
took no part in the litigation, according to the reports.
The Chicago aid Southern decision is an unequivocal assertion of Board
authority over an intrastate 'service. While it reflects a consideration of
state and local interests, it expresses no doubt concerning the Board's juris-
diction over the matter. It does not solve the problem that would be pre-
sented if the state and local interests in the case should choose to challenge
the asserted authority of the Board. 0 It is probable that through such ac-
tions, the present language of the Act will be interpreted to have given the
28 41 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). The fact that more cases have not
been considered by the courts is no indication of lack of Board authority in such
matters, but probably reflects a reluctance of the Board to take up such situa-
tions without initial action by a carrier.
29 Annual Report CAB 35 (1941).
30 For a time, such challenge was in prospect. On November 4, 1949, Chicago
and Southern petitioned the Illinois Commerce Commission for abandonment of the
intrastate service and cancellation of its certificate with respect to the three Illi-
nois cities (Proceeding No. 37906) ; a second petition by C & S on the same date
sought suspension of service to Peoria (the only point then being actually served)
pending action on the first request (Proceeding No. 37907). At the Examiner's
hearing November 28, C & S challenged the jurisdiction of the Commission on the
ground that the CAB has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over both interstate and
intrastate commercial air transportation by virtue of the Civil Aeronautics Act.
The case was then heard on its merits. On December 14, there having been no or-
der on the aforementioned petition, C & S filed a time schedule with the Commis-
sion proposing discontinuance of its intrastate service as of December 26, the
effective date of the CAB order cited supra note 3. The Commission, on December
21, answered this with an ex parte order suspending the proposed time schedule
until April 25, 1950 and setting a hearing on the matter for March 21, 1950 (Pro-
ceeding No. 38029). On December 26, C & S suspended service to Peoria, in com-
pliance with the CAB order, but contrary to the Commission's order of December
21. Two days later, C & S filed an action in the U.S. District Court (N. D. Ill.,
Eastern Division) requesting an order restraining the Commission and other
defendants from attempting to compel operation of the intrastate service, and
from enforcing any order of the Commission inconsistent with the Civil Aeronau-
tics Act (No. 49-C-1961). A temporary order was granted. On January 19, 1950,
the Commission suddenly acted upon the original C & S petition of November 4,
1949 (Proceeding No. 37906), and cancelled and rescinded the C & S certificate for
intrastate service, and ordered that no action be taken to enforce penal provisions
against C & S for discontinuance of the service prior to this order. However, the
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Board broad powers to economically regulate these intrastate operations.
However, the need for clarification of the Board's authority in this field is
immediate. This has been recently illustrated by the California situation in
which low-fare, non-certificated, intrastate carriers have been competing
with certificated interstate airlines and clearly affecting the economic con-
ditions of the latter.8 ' Intrastate-interstate problems will become increas-
ingly common with the extension of commercial air service to smaller
communities within a single state which by virtue of such service find
themselves within the stream of interstate commerce. To meet this grow-
ing problem and to clearly equip the Board with power to carry out the pol-
icies of the Act, the Congress should enact recently proposed legisla-
tion which would amend the Act to expressly give the Board economic
jurisdiction over intrastate operations of interstate carriers and over
the operations of intrastate carriers insofar as they compete with interstate
carriers8 2
BERNARD R. BALCH*
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ROUTE ORDERS OF
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARDS TATE Airlines Inc. and Piedmont Aviations Inc. sought local or
"feeder"' air transportation certificates for an area in southeastern
United States.2 The Board granted a certificate of public convenience and
necessity to Piedmont and denied State's application.8 On petition for re-
hearing State urged that the Board's award to Piedmont was unlawful
since Piedmont had not applied for the route which had been granted to it,
and that by such a grant, the Board had acted beyond its jurisdiction.4 Fur-
thermore, State argued that the finding that Piedmont was fit, willing, and
able was not supported by substantial evidence. The Board found, however,
that Piedmont was an applicant for the route awarded to it, since it had
included in its application a clause which requested not only the route
detailed within the petition, but any modification of that route which the
Commission claimed jurisdiction of the matter, contrary to C & S's contention be-
fore the Examiner that the CAB has sole and exclusive jurisdiction. Finally, on
January 25, the District Court entered an order dismissing the C & S action for a
permanent restraining order, regarding the case as mooted by the January 19 ac-
tion of the Commission.
81 See American Aviation, July 15, 1949, p. 23, and September 1, 1949, p. 18.
82 S. 2759, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., by Sen. Johnson (D.-Colo.) extends jurisdic-
tion under the Act to include all but local carriers, and defines local carrier as
a person in intrastate commerce whose operations do not compete with registered
carriers under the Act.
*Student, Northwestern Law School, Competitor, Legal Publications Board.
'A local or "feeder" air route is one made up largely of stops in small com-
munities. These communities are tied in with larger communities by short haul
operations. Thus, communities with a community of interest are joined regardless
of size.
2 The Civil Aeronautics Board consolidated for hearing in a single proceeding
known as the Southeastern States Case, 7 C.A.B. 863 (1947), some 45 applications
by 25 companies proposing new and additional air transportation services. The
area included the states, or a portion of the states of Florida, Mississippi, Ala-
bama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri,
Ohio, Indiana, West Virginia, District of Columbia, and Maryland.
3 The Board ignored the recommendations of the special Examiners who on
June 4, 1946 issued their report recommending that the area be split into four
separate "feeder" routes, one of which was to go to State, the others to Piedmont.
4 For purposes of review of an order of the Board, there is no final order until
a rehearing has been denied by the Board. Braniff Airways v. C.A.B., 147 F. (2d)
152 (C.A.D.C. 1945).
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Board thought necessary.5 The Board ruled also that there was substantial
evidence upon which it had based its findings that Piedmont was fit, willing,
and able.
On petition for review the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in State Airlines v. C.A.B., overruled the Board's decision., The Court found
that the route awarded was something more than mere modification of the
route applied for; that section 401(d) (1) of the Civil Aeronautics Act re-
quired an application for the route before an award could be made ;7 and fur-
ther that the award was arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by sub-
stantial evidence.
The case is of some consequence since it presents for the first time the
question of the definitive limits of the Board's broad discretion. There is
no doubt that essentially the selection of a certain air line for a new air
route is a task for administrative judgment.8 It has been felt that admin-
istrative agencies are peculiarly equipped to find the facts and should be
the final arbiters of public interest concerning those factsY The question now
presented is whether the Board has gone too far in exercising its discretion.
From its inception the Courts have given the C. A. B. a fairly free rein over
their administrative domain. 10 The fulfillment of the substantial evidence
test, always a necessary prerequisite, has not been a difficult task for the
Board," and as in the case of administrative determinations, generally,
administrative findings constantly tend to replace court adjudications. 12
The Court here would not seem to be signalling a trend away from this
munificent treatment; it merely appears to be pointing out to the Board the
limits of its discretion.
5 The clause stated that Piedmont applied for authorization to engage in air
transportation "on routes detailed herein or such modification as the Board may
find public convenience and necessity to require."
6 174 F.(2d) 510 (C.A.D.C. 1949).
T "The authority shall issue a certificate authorizing the whole or any part
of the transportation covered by the application, if it finds that the applicant is
fit, willing, and able to perform such transportation properly, and to confrom to
the provisions of this Act and the rules, regulations, and requirements of the
authority hereunder and such transportation is required by the public convenience
and necessity: otherwise, the application shall be denied." 52 Stat. 987 (1938) 49,
U.S.C.A. §481(d) (1948 Supp.). The Court held that it was without power to
order a certificate to State, and therefore remanded the case for further proceed-
ings not inconsistent with the opinion. Piedmont has taken the case to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
8 United Air Lines v. C.A.B., 155 F.(2d) 169 (C.A.D.C. 1946).
9 U.S. v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, 327 U.S. 515 (1946).
10 For an example of this gentle treatment, see, W. B. Grace & Co. v. C.A.B.,
154 F.(2d) 231 (C.C.A. 2d 1946). "The review of orders of the Civil Aeronautics
Board by the courts is not mere private litigation, but the public interest looms
large and hence, there is no place on such review for overly-nice scrutiny of the
pleadings and undue stress of alleged estoppels." See also: U.S. Lines Co. v.
C.A.B., 165 F.(2d) 849. (C.C.A. 2d 1948).
11 O'Carroll v. C.A.B., 144 F.(2d) 999 (C.A.D.C. 1944); Cameron v. C.A.B.,
140 F.(2d) 482 (C.C.A. 7th 1944).
12 DIMOCK, ESSAYS ON LAW AND PRACTICE OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRA-
TION, 298 (1935). This tendency or movement has at times been halted. As in
the days of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), but with the exception of a
few isolated cases such as Pittsburgh Steamship Co. v. Brown, 171 F.(2d) 175
(C.C.A. 7th 1948) ; Daffin v. Pape, 170 F.(2d) 622 (C.C.A. 5th 1948) ; and see note(1949) 44 Ill. L. Rev. 537; the trend in past years has been toward a less
stringent judicial supervision over the administrative fact-finder. This lenient
or "liberal" approach is seen in cases like: South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v.
Bassett, 104 F. (2d) 522 (C.C.A. 7th 1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 251 (1940); Gud-
mundson v. Cardillo, 126 F. (2d) 521 (C. A. D. C. 1942); Shields v. Utah
Idaho Central Ry., 305 U.S. 177 (1938); City of Yonkers v. U.S., 320 U.S.
685 (1943); Davis v. Dept. of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942) ; Railroad Commission
V. Roi,,n & VichoR Oil Co.. 310 U.S. 573 (1940) ; Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296
U.S. 280 (1935); L'Hote v. Crowell, 286 U.S. 528 (1932).
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Judicial review of the Board's decision is provided for in Section 1006 (a)
of the Act, 13 and Section 1006(e) states that findings of fact by the Author-
ity, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. 14 The Court,
though it believes that the questions of fitness, willingness, and ability are
for expert judgment in aviation matters, feels that the Board has completely
ignored the standards which Congress has set for it. It then appears that
the case presents two questions; first, whether Piedmont's application was
broad enough under the Act to support the Board's grant; and second,
whether there was, in fact, evidence with which to support the Board's
finding that Piedmont was fit, willing, and able to adequately perform such
transportation.
The catch-all phrase in Piedmont's application contained the word "modi-
fication." Around the definition of this word centers the court's finding that
the Board's action went beyond its jurisdiction in granting to Piedmont a
route for which it had not applied. Modification has been judicially defined
as a change, an alteration which introduces new elements of detail, but
leaves the general subject matter or susbtance unchanged. 1 The Court held
that the route awarded to Piedmont was more than a mere modification of
detail, but was in fact a material alteration of the substance. Whereas a
modification leaves the route substantially unchanged, the Board's action
constituted a material deviation from the actual routes. The Board found
support for their holding from cases coming from other Administrative
agencies which found a variation from the issues specifically presented
by the moving papers in the proceedings before them.' 6 Upon examination,
these cases do not appear to be authority for the proposition asserted.
These cases do not give the Board sanction to completely ignore the mov-
ing papers or section 401 of the Act nor to make their findings without refer-
ence to the petitions before them. The cases merely allow the Board some lee-
way from the specific issues presented to them by the petitioners. The Court
exercised the power to overrule the Board's findings since there was such a
disparity between the route applied for and the route granted as to be arbi-
trary, capricious, and completely unreasonable. Since Piedmont applied for a
specific route or any modification of that route the Court was not confronted
directly with the question of whether or not the Act allows for any modifica-
tion. The opinion of the Court merely stands for the proposition that the
Board will be allowed a small degree of variance; if that variance has been
applied for. Where, as here, the route awarded is a complete change from the
route applied for, a catch-all clause petitioning for a modification of the route
applied for may not be used by the Board to meet the necessity of an applica-
tion for the route awarded.
17
18 "Any order, affirmative or negative, issued by the Board under this Act,
except any order in respect of any foreign air carrier subject to the approval of
the President as provided in Section 801 of this Act, shall be subject to review
by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the U.S. or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia upon petition, filed within 60 days after the entry of such
order, by any person disclosing a substantial interest in such order. .. " 52 Stat.
1024 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. §646 (Supp. .1948).
14 52 Stat. 1024 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. §646(e) (Supp. 1948).
15 N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), Cincin-
nati, Hamilton, and Dayton Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 206 U.S.
142 (1906); Chicago, St. Paul and Minneapolis and Omaha Railway Co. v. U.S.,
322 U.S. 1 (1943); W.R.E.C. v. Federal Radio Commission, 67 F.(2d) 578
(C.A.D.C.) ; F.C.C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940). Cited by
counsel for the Board in their excellent brief in the Supreme Court of the U.S.,
Nos. 157 and 158, October Term, 1949, p. 19.
16 Supra.
17 It seems clear that the courts will allow the Board some varience in view
of the cases cited above (Supra. 16) in the name of public convenience and
necessity.
JUDICIAL
The significance of the Court's finding should not be underestimated.
The issue of how much change the courts can allow is not mere rhetoric.
To allow the Board to grant routes vastly different from those applied
for makes judicial discovery of an arbitrary grant impossible, since the
evidence before the Court as to a petitioning air line's fitness and ability
would be entirely irrelevant.' 8 The possibility of favoritism would be ever
present with the relinquishment of this essential judicial check rein.
The Court's decision that there was no substantial evidence to support the
Board's finding as to Piedmont's qualifications cannot be entirely divorced
from its conclusion that Piedmont was not an applicant for the route
awarded. It is obvious that Piedmont could not have evidenced its qualifica-
tions for a route for which it did not apply. This shortcoming is especially
apparent in the present case since the two routes are over dissimilar terrain
and would no doubt require the utilization of essentially different equipment
and services.
The Board in the case of Braniff Airways v. C.A.B.'9 developed the pres-
ently followed tests for fitness and willingness. These are the ones which
courts look to in order to determine whether or not there was evidence
to support the Board's finding. The necessary prerequisites are: a proper
organizational basis for the conduct of air transportation; a plan for the
conduct of the service made by competent personnel; and an adequate finan-
cial resource. 20 The Court found the record barren of any substantial evi-
dence, showing that Piedmont had met these tests with respect to the opera-
tion granted. In fact, there was evidence to the contrary.2 1 The Board has
failed to meet its own tests and it appears that the Court was correct in find-
ing that the Board had acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
In so finding the Court has decided: that an air line must be an applicant
for the route granted, that in order to be an applicant the application must
be substantially directed toward the route awarded; and finally that the rec-
ord before the court must show that the applicant was fit, willing, and able to
perform the route awarded to it. This decision appears to be sound judicial
treatment of an administrative determination. Unless the Supreme Court,
which is now hearing oral argument on the case, decides that no application
is necessary for the particular route granted and by so doing gives the broad-
est possible interpretation of Section 401(d) (1) of the Civil Aeronautics Act,
the opinion of the court should be affirmed.22
ROBERT F. HANLEY*
18 See Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414 (1943).
19 147 F.(2d) 152 (C.A.D.C. 1945).
20 The route ultimately awarded to Piedmont was west of the Appalachians
over mountainous terrain. Counsel for Piedmont in oral argument before the
Board made statements with regard to the non-mountainous character of its ap-
plication emphasizing its non-mountainous terrain. He also based all of his evi-
dence and exhibits on the performance of a Noordvyn Norseman v. a single-engine
plane, whereas State proposed to use twin engine planes.
21 It is of interest to note that §10 of the Administrative Procedure Act states
that reviewing courts are empowered to set aside agency actions, findings, and
conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or not other-
wise in accordance with law, and also those unsupported by substantial evidence.
Unless the Supreme Court redefines the words in this section, it would appear
that the Court's decision was correct.
22 After this note had gone to press the Supreme Court, on February 6, 1950,
delivered its opinion. It reversed the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia discussed above. The majority held that it was not the Congres-
sional purpose to bar the Board from granting any certificates in which the routes
awarded deviate more than slightly from the precise routes defined in the applica-
tion.
* Student, Northwestern Law School, Competitor, Legal Publications Board.
